Walled Culture first wrote about Piracy Shield, Italy’s automated system for tackling alleged copyright infringement in the streaming sector, two years ago. Since then, we have written about the serious problems that soon emerged. But instead of fixing those issues, the government body that runs the scheme, Italy’s AGCOM (the Italian Authority for Communications Guarantees), has extended it. The problems may be evident, but they have not been systematically studied, until now: a peer-reviewed study from a group of (mostly Italian) researchers has just been published as a preprint (found via TorrentFreak). It’s particularly welcome as perhaps the first rigorous analysis of Piracy Shield and its flaws.
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one of the major concerns about the system is the lack of transparency: AGCOM does not publish a list of IP addresses or domain names that are subject to its blocking. That not only makes it extremely difficult to correct mistakes, it also – conveniently – hides those mistakes, as well as the scope and impact of Piracy Shield. To get around this lack of transparency, the researchers had to resort to a dataset leaked on GitHub, which contained 10,918 IPv4 addresses and 42,664 domain names (more precisely, the latter were “fully qualified domain names” – FQDN) that had been blocked. As good academics, the researchers naturally verified the dataset as best they could:
While this dataset may not be exhaustive … it nonetheless provides a conservative lower-bound estimate of the platform’s blocking activity, which serves as the foundation for the subsequent analyses.
Much of the paper is devoted to the detailed methodology. One important result is that many of the blocked IP addresses belonged to leased IP address space. As the researchers explain:
This suggests that illegal streamers may attempt to exploit leased address space more intensively, even if just indirectly, by obtaining them by hosting companies that leases them, leading to more potential collateral damages for new lessees.
This particular collateral damage arises from the fact that even after the leased IP address is released by those who are using it for allegedly unauthorised streaming, it is still blocked on the Piracy Shield system. That means whoever is allocated that leased IP address subsequently is blocked by AGCOM, but are probably unaware of that fact, because of the opaque nature of the blocking process. More generally, collateral damage arose from the wrongful blocking of a wide range of completely legitimate sites:
During our classification process, we observed a wide range of website types across these collaterally affected domains, including personal branding pages, company profiles, and websites for hotels and restaurants. One notable case involves 19 Albanian websites hosted on a single IP address assigned to WIIT Cloud. These sites are still unreachable from Italy.
Italian sites were also hit, including a car mechanic, several retail shops, an accountant, a telehealth missionary program – and a nunnery. More amusingly, the researchers write:
we found a case of collateral damage involving a Google IP. Closer inspection revealed the IP was used by Telecom Italia to serve a blocking page for FQDNs filtered by Piracy Shield. Although later removed from the blocklist, this case suggests that collateral damage may have affected the blocking infrastructure itself.
The academics summarise their work as follows:
Our results on the collateral damages of IP and FQDN blocking highlight a worrisome scenario, with hundreds of legitimate websites unknowingly affected by blocking, unknown operators experiencing service disruption, and illegal streamers continuing to evade enforcement by exploiting the abundance of address space online, leaving behind unusable and polluted address ranges. Still, our findings represent a conservative lower-bound estimate.
It distinguished three ways in which Piracy Shield is harmful. Economically, because it disrupts legitimate businesses; technically, because it blocks shared infrastructure such as content delivery networks, while “polluting the IP address space” for future, unsuspecting users; and operationally, because it imposes a “growing, uncompensated burden on Italian ISPs forced to implement an expanding list of permanent blocks.” The paper concludes with some practical suggestions for improving a system that is clearly not fit for purpose, and poses a threat to national security, as discussed previously on Walled Culture. The researchers suggest that:
widespread and difficult-to-predict collateral damage suggests that IP-level blocking is an indiscriminate tool with consequences that outweigh its benefits and should not be used.
Instead, they point out that there are other legal pathways that can be pursued, since many of the allegedly infringing streams originate within the EU. If FQDN blocking is used, it should be regarded as “a last resort in tightly constrained time windows, i.e., only for the duration of the live event.” Crucially, more transparency is needed from AGCOM:
To mitigate damages, resource owners must be immediately notified when their assets are blocked, and a clear, fast unblocking mechanism must be in place.
This is an important piece of work, because it places criticisms of Piracy Shield on a firm footing, with rigorous analysis of the facts. However, AGCOM is unlike to pay attention, since it is in the process of expanding Piracy Shield to apply to vast swathes of online streaming: amendments to the relevant law mean that automatic blocks can now be applied to film premieres, and even run-of-the-mill TV shows. Based on its past behaviour, the copyright industry may well push to extend Piracy Shield to static Web material too, on the basis that the blocking infrastructure is already in place, so why not use it for every kind of material?
