Age Verification, Estimation, Assurance, Oh My! A Guide To The Terminology

If you’ve been following the wave of age-gating laws sweeping across the country and the globe, you’ve probably noticed that lawmakers, tech companies, and advocates all seem to be using different terms for what sounds like the same thing. Age verification, age assurance, age estimation, age gating—they get thrown around interchangeably, but they technically mean different things. And those differences matter a lot when we’re talking about your rights, your privacy, your data, and who gets to access information online.

[click the source link below to read the different definitions – ed]

Why This Confusion Matters

Politicians and tech companies love using these terms interchangeably because it obscures what they’re actually proposing. A law that requires “age assurance” sounds reasonable and moderate. But if that law defines age assurance as requiring government ID verification, it’s not moderate at all—it’s mass surveillance. Similarly, when Instagram says it’s using “age estimation” to protect teens, that sounds privacy-friendly. But when their estimation fails and forces you to upload your driver’s license instead, the privacy promise evaporates.

Here’s the uncomfortable truth: most lawmakers writing these bills have no idea how any of this technology actually works. They don’t know that age estimation systems routinely fail for people of color, trans individuals, and people with disabilities. They don’t know that verification systems have error rates. They don’t even seem to understand that the terms they’re using mean different things. The fact that their terminology is all over the place—using “age assurance,” “age verification,” and “age estimation” interchangeably—makes this ignorance painfully clear, and leaves the onus on platforms to choose whichever option best insulates them from liability.

Language matters because it shapes how we think about these systems. “Assurance” sounds gentle. “Verification” sounds official. “Estimation” sounds technical and impersonal, and also admits its inherent imprecision. But they all involve collecting your data and create a metaphysical age gate to the internet. The terminology is deliberately confusing, but the stakes are clear: it’s your privacy, your data, and your ability to access the internet without constant identity checks. Don’t let fuzzy language disguise what these systems really do.

Republished from EFF’s Deeplinks blog.

Source: Age Verification, Estimation, Assurance, Oh My! A Guide To The Terminology | Techdirt

The unpowered SSDs in your drawer are slowly losing your data

SSDs have all but replaced hard drives when it comes to primary storage. They’re orders of magnitude faster, more convenient, and consume less power than mechanical hard drives. That said, if you’re also using SSDs for cold storage, expecting the drives lying in your drawer to work perfectly after years, you might want to rethink your strategy

[…]

Unlike hard drives that magnetize spinning discs to store data, SSDs modify the electrical charge in NAND flash cells to represent 0 and 1. NAND flash retains data in underlying transistors even when power is removed, similar to other forms of non-volatile memory. However, the duration for which your SSD can retain data without power is the key here. Even the cheapest SSDs, say those with QLC NAND, can safely store data for about a year of being completely unpowered. More expensive TLC NAND can retain data for up to 3 years, while MLC and SLC NAND are good for 5 years and 10 years of unpowered storage, respectively.

The problem is that most consumer SSDs use only TLC or QLC NAND, so users who leave their SSDs unpowered for over a year are risking the integrity of their data. The reliability of QLC NAND has improved over the years, so you should probably consider 2–3 years of unpowered usage as the guardrails. Without power, the voltage stored in the NAND cells can be lost, either resulting in missing data or completely useless drives.

[…]

SSDs aren’t eternal, even if you keep them powered on forever. The limited write cycles of NAND flash will eventually bring an SSD to the end of its lifecycle, but the majority of users will probably replace the drive before that ever happens.

[…]

Source: The unpowered SSDs in your drawer are slowly losing your data

CISA: Spyware crews breaking into Signal, WhatsApp accounts

CISA has warned that state-backed snoops and cyber-mercenaries are actively abusing commercial spyware to break into Signal and WhatsApp accounts, hijack devices, and quietly rummage through the phones of what the agency calls “high-value” users.

In an alert published Monday, the US government’s cyber agency said it’s tracking multiple miscreants that are using a mix of phishing, bogus QR codes, malicious app impersonation, and, in some cases, full-blown zero-click exploits to compromise messaging apps which most people assume are safe.

The agency says the activity it’s seeing suggests an increasing focus on “high-value” individuals – everyone from current and former senior government, military, and political officials to civil society groups across the US, the Middle East, and Europe. In many of the campaigns, attackers delivered spyware first and asked questions later, using the foothold to deploy more payloads and deepen their access.

“CISA is aware of multiple cyber threat actors actively leveraging commercial spyware to target users of mobile messaging applications,” the agency said. “These cyber actors use sophisticated targeting and social engineering techniques to deliver spyware and gain unauthorized access to a victim’s messaging app, facilitating the deployment of additional malicious payloads that can further compromise the victim’s mobile device.”

The campaigns CISA flags in its bulletin show attackers doing what they do best: sidestepping encryption entirely by spoofing apps, abusing account features, and exploiting the phones underneath them.

For example, Google’s Threat Intelligence Group in February detailed how multiple Russia-aligned crews, including Sandworm and Turla, attempted to snoop on Signal users by abusing the app’s “linked devices” feature. By coaxing victims into scanning a tampered QR code, the operators could quietly add a second, attacker-controlled device to the account. Once paired, new messages flowed to both ends in real time, letting Moscow’s finest eavesdrop.

CISA also pointed to a separate line of Android exploitation work, spearheaded by Palo Alto Networks’ Unit 42, in which commercial-grade spyware known as LANDFALL was delivered to Samsung Galaxy devices. Uncovered earlier this month, this campaign combined a Samsung vulnerability with a zero-click WhatsApp exploit, allowing operators to slip a malicious image into a target’s inbox and have the device compromise itself on receipt.

Not all the activity relied on exploits. Several of the campaigns CISA cites – including ProSpy and ToSpy – made headway by impersonating familiar apps such as Signal and TikTok, hoovering up chat data, recordings, and files once it landed on a device. Meanwhile, Zimperium’s researchers identified ClayRat, an Android spyware family that has been seeded across Russia via counterfeit Telegram channels and lookalike phishing sites masquerading as WhatsApp, TikTok, and YouTube.

CISA’s alert lands amid heightened scrutiny of commercial spyware vendors. The US recently barred NSO Group from targeting WhatsApp users with Pegasus, and earlier this year, the US House of Representatives banned WhatsApp from staff devices after a string of security concerns. This move reflects the uncomfortable reality behind CISA’s warning: attackers aren’t breaking encrypted messengers, they’re simply burrowing under them. ®

Source: CISA: Spyware crews breaking into Signal, WhatsApp accounts • The Register

Danish manage to bypass democracy to implement mass EU surveillance, says it is “voluntary”

The EU states agree on a common position on chat control. Internet services should be allowed to read communication voluntarily, but will not be obliged [*cough – see bold and end of document: Ed*] to do so. We publish the classified negotiating protocol and bill. After the formal decision, the trilogue negotiations begin.

18.11.2025 at 14:03– Andre Meister – in surveillanceno additions

Man in suit at lectern, behind him flags.
Presidency of the Council: Danish Minister of Justice Hummelgaard. – CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 Danish Presidency

The EU states have agreed on a common position on chat control. We publish the bill.

Last week, the Council working group discussed the law. We shall once again publish the classified minutes of the meeting.

Tomorrow, the Permanent Representatives want to officially decide on the position.

Update 19.10.: A Council spokesperson tells us, “The agenda item has been postponed until next week.”

Three years of dispute

For three and a half years, the EU institutions have been arguing over chat control. The Commission intends to oblige Internet services to search the content of their users without cause for information on criminal offences and to send them to authorities if suspected.

Parliament calls this mass surveillance and calls for only unencrypted content from suspects to be scanned.

A majority of EU countries want mandatory chat control. However, a blocking minority rejects this. Now the Council has agreed on a compromise. Internet services are not required to chat control, but may carry out a voluntary chat control.

Absolute red lines

The Danish Presidency wants to bring the draft law through the Council “as soon as possible” so that the trilogue negotiations can be started in a timely manner. The feedback from the states should be limited to “absolute red lines”.

The majority of states “supported the compromise proposal.” At least 15 spoke out in favour, including Germany and France.

Germany “welcomed both the deletion of the mandatory measures and the permanent anchoring of voluntary measures.”

Italy also sees voluntary chat control as skeptical. “We fear that the instrument could also be extended to other crimes, so we have difficulty supporting the proposal.” Politicians have already called for chat control to be extended to other content.

Absolute minimum consensus

Other states called the compromise “an absolute minimum consensus.” They “actually wanted more – especially in the sense of commitments.” Some states “showed themselves clearly disappointed by the cancellations made.”

Spain, in particular, “still considered mandatory measures to be necessary, unfortunately, a comprehensive agreement on this was not possible.” Hungary, too, “saw volunteerism as the sole concept as too little.”

Spain, Hungary and Bulgaria proposed “an obligation for providers to have to expose at least in open areas.” The Danish Presidency “described the proposal as ambitious, but did not take it up to avoid further discussion.”

Denmark explicitly pointed to the review clause. Thus, “the possibility of detection orders is kept open at a later date.” Hungary stressed that “this possibility must also be used.”

No obligation

The Danish Presidency had publicly announced that the chat control should not be mandatory, but voluntary.

However, the formulated compromise proposal was contradictory. She had deleted the article on mandatory chat control. However, another article said services should also carry out voluntary measures.

Several states have asked whether these formulations “could lead to a de facto obligation.” The Legal Services agreed: “The wording can be interpreted in both directions.” The Presidency of the Council “clarified that the text only had a risk mitigation obligation, but not a commitment to detection.”

The day after the meeting, the presidency of the Council sent out the likely final draft law of the Council. It states explicitly: ‘No provision of this Regulation shall be interpreted as imposing obligations of detection obligations on providers’.

Damage and abuse

Mandatory chat control is not the only issue in the planned law. Voluntary chat control is also prohibited. The European Commission cannot prove its proportionality. Many oppose voluntary chat control, including the EU Commission, the European Data Protection Supervisor and the German Data Protection Supervisor.

A number of scientists are critical of the compromise proposal. The voluntary chat control does not designate it to be appropriate. “Their benefit is not proven, while the potential for harm and abuse is enormous.”

The law also calls for mandatory age checks. The scientists criticize that age checks “bring with it an inherent and disproportionate risk of serious data breaches and discrimination without guaranteeing their effectiveness.” The Federal Data Protection Officer also fears a “large-scale abolition of anonymity on the Internet.”

Now follows Trilog

The EU countries will not discuss these points further. The Danish Presidency “reaffirmed its commitment to the compromise proposal without the Spanish proposals.”

The Permanent Representatives of the EU States will meet next week. In December, the justice and interior ministers meet. These two bodies are to adopt the bill as the official position of the Council.

This is followed by the trilogue. There, the Commission, Parliament and the Council negotiate to reach a compromise from their three separate bills.

[…]

A “risk mitigation obligation” can be used to explain anything and obligate spying through whatever services the EU says there is “risk”

Source: Translated from EU states agree on voluntary chat control

Considering the whole proposal was shot down several times in the past years and even past month, using a back door rush to push this through is not how a democracy is supposed to function at all. And this is how fascism grips it’s iron claws. What is going on in Demark?

For more information on the history of Chat Control click here