Hacker swipes Snapchat’s source code, publishes it on GitHub

Snapchat doesn’t just make messages disappear after a period of time. It also does the same to GitHub repositories — especially when they contain the company’s proprietary source code.

So, what happened? Well, let’s start from the beginning. A GitHub with the handle i5xx, believed to be from the village of Tando Bago in Pakistan’s southeastern Sindh province, created a GitHub repository called Source-Snapchat.

At the time of writing, the repo has been removed by GitHub following a DMCA request from Snap Inc

[…]

Four days ago, GitHub published a DMCA takedown request from Snap Inc., although it’s likely the request was filed much earlier. GitHub, like many other tech giants including Google, publishes information on DMCA takedown requests from the perspective of transparency.

[…]

To the question “Please provide a detailed description of the original copyrighted work that has allegedly been infringed. If possible, include a URL to where it is posted online,” the Snap Inc representative wrote:

“SNAPCHAT SOURCE CODE. IT WAS LEAKED AND A USER HAS PUT IT IN THIS GITHUB REPO. THERE IS NO URL TO POINT TO BECAUSE SNAP INC. DOESN’T PUBLISH IT PUBLICLY.”

The most fascinating part of this saga is that the leak doesn’t appear to be malicious, but rather comes from a researcher who found something, but wasn’t able to communicate his findings to the company.

According to several posts on a Twitter account believed to belong to i5xx, the researcher tried to contact SnapChat, but was unsuccessful.

“The problem we tried to communicate with you but did not succeed In that we decided [sic] Deploy source code,” wrote i5xx.

The account also threatened to re-upload the source code. “I will post it again until you reply :),” he said.

For what it’s worth, it’s pretty easy for security researchers to get in touch with Snap Inc. The company has an active account on HackerOne, where it runs a bug bounty program, and is extremely responsive.

According to HackerOne’s official statistics, the site replies to initial reports in 12 hours, and has paid out over $220,000 in bounties.

Source: Hacker swipes Snapchat’s source code, publishes it on GitHub

AI builds wiki entries for people that aren’t on it but should be

Human-generated knowledge bases like Wikipedia have a recall problem. First, there are the articles that should be there but are entirely missing. The unknown unknowns.

Consider Joelle Pineau, the Canadian roboticist bringing scientific rigor to artificial intelligence and who directs Facebook’s new AI Research lab in Montreal. Or Miriam Adelson, an actively publishing addiction treatment researcher who happens to be a billionaire by marriage and a major funder of her own field. Or Evelyn Wang, the new head of MIT’s revered MechE department whose accomplishments include a device that generates drinkable water from sunlight and desert air. When I wrote this a few days ago, none of them had articles on English Wikipedia, though they should by any measure of notability.

(Pineau is up now thanks to my friend and fellow science crusader Jess Wade who created an article just hours after I told her about Pineau’s absence. And if the internet is in a good mood, someone will create articles for the other two soon after this post goes live.)

But I didn’t discover those people on my own. I used a machine learning system we’re building at Primer. It discovered and described them for me. It does this much as a human would, if a human could read 500 million news articles, 39 million scientific papers, all of Wikipedia, and then write 70,000 biographical summaries of scientists.

[…]

We are publicly releasing free-licensed data about scientists that we’ve been generating along the way, starting with 30,000 computer scientists. Only 15% of them are known to Wikipedia. The data set includes 1 million news sentences that quote or describe the scientists, metadata for the source articles, a mapping to their published work in the Semantic Scholar Open Research Corpus, and mappings to their Wikipedia and Wikidata entries. We will revise and add to that data as we go. (Many thanks to Oren Etzioni and AI2 for data and feedback.) Our aim is to help the open data research community build better tools for maintaining Wikipedia and Wikidata, starting with scientific content.

Fluid Knowledge

We trained Quicksilver’s models on 30,000 English Wikipedia articles about scientists, their Wikidata entries, and over 3 million sentences from news documents describing them and their work. Then we fed in the names and affiliations of 200,000 authors of scientific papers.

In the morning we found 40,000 people missing from Wikipedia who have a similar distribution of news coverage as those who do have articles. Quicksilver doubled the number of scientists potentially eligible for a Wikipedia article overnight.

It also revealed the second flavor of the recall problem that plagues human-generated knowledge bases: information decay. For most of those 30,000 scientists who are on English Wikipedia, Quicksilver identified relevant information that was missing from their articles.

Source: Primer | Machine-Generated Knowledge Bases

Data center server BMCs are terribly outdated and insecure

BMCs can be used to remotely monitor system temperature, voltage and power consumption, operating system health, and so on, and power cycle the box if it runs into trouble, tweak configurations, and even, depending on the setup, reinstall the OS – all from the comfort of an operations center, as opposed to having to find an errant server in the middle of a data center to physically wrangle. They also provide the foundations for IPMI.

[…]

It’s a situation not unlike Intel’s Active Management Technology, a remote management component that sits under the OS or hypervisor, has total control over a system, and been exploited more than once over the years.

Waisman and his colleague Matias Soler, a senior security researcher at Immunity, examined these BMC systems, and claimed the results weren’t good. They even tried some old-school hacking techniques from the 1990s against the equipment they could get hold of, and found them to be very successful. With HP’s BMC-based remote management technology iLO4, for example, the builtin web server could be tricked into thinking a remote attacker was local, and so didn’t need to authenticate them.

“We decided to take a look at these devices and what we found was even worse than what we could have imagined,” the pair said. “Vulnerabilities that bring back memories from the 1990s, remote code execution that is 100 per cent reliable, and the possibility of moving bidirectionally between the server and the BMC, making not only an amazing lateral movement angle, but the perfect backdoor too.”

The fear is that once an intruder gets into a data center network, insecure BMC firmware could be used to turn a drama into a crisis: vulnerabilities in the technology could be exploited to hijack more systems, install malware that persists across reboots and reinstalls, or simple hide from administrators.

[…]

The duo probed whatever kit they could get hold of – mainly older equipment – and it could be that modern stuff is a lot better in terms of security with firmware that follows secure coding best practices. On the other hand, what Waisman and Soler have found and documented doesn’t inspire a terrible amount of confidence in newer gear.

Their full findings can be found here, and their slides here.

Source: Can we talk about the little backdoors in data center servers, please? • The Register

TSA says ‘Quiet Skies’ surveillance snared zero threats but put 5000 travellers under surveillance and on no fly lists

SA officials were summoned to Capitol Hill Wednesday and Thursday afternoon following Globe reports on the secret program, which sparked sharp criticism because it includes extensive surveillance of domestic fliers who are not suspected of a crime or listed on any terrorist watch list.

“Quiet Skies is the very definition of Big Brother,” Senator Edward Markey of Massachusetts, a member of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation committee, said broadly about the program. “American travelers deserve to have their privacy and civil rights protected even 30,000 feet in the air.”

[…]

The teams document whether passengers fidget, use a computer, or have a “cold penetrating stare,” among other behaviors, according to agency documents.

All US citizens who enter the country from abroad are screened via Quiet Skies. Passengers may be selected through a broad, undisclosed set of criteria for enhanced surveillance by a team of air marshals on subsequent domestic flights, according to agency documents.

Dozens of air marshals told the Globe the “special mission coverage” seems to test the limits of the law, and is a waste of time and resources. Several said surveillance teams had been assigned to follow people who appeared to pose no threat — a working flight attendant, a businesswoman, a fellow law enforcement officer — and to document their actions in-flight and through airports.

[…]

The officials said about 5,000 US citizens had been closely monitored since March and none of them were deemed suspicious or merited further scrutiny, according to people with direct knowledge of the Thursday meeting.

Source: TSA says ‘Quiet Skies’ surveillance snared zero threats – The Boston Globe

Didn’t the TSA learn anything from the no-fly lists not working in the first place?!