GitLab issues security fix for hardcoded password flaw in OmniAuth

The cloud-hosted software version control service released versions 14.9.2, 14.8.5, and 14.7.7 of its self-hosted CE and EE software, fixing one “critical” security vulnerability (CVE-2022-1162), as well as two rated “high,” nine rated “medium,” and four rated “low.”

“A hard-coded password was set for accounts registered using an OmniAuth provider (e.g. OAuth, LDAP, SAML) in GitLab CE/EE versions 14.7 prior to 14.7.7, 14.8 prior to 14.8.5, and 14.9 prior to 14.9.2 allowing attackers to potentially take over accounts,” the company said in its advisory.

It appears from the changed files the password.rb module generated a fake strong password for testing by concatenating “123qweQWE!@#” with a number of “0”s equal to the difference of User.password_length.max, which is user-set, and DEFAULT_LENGTH, which hard-coded with the value 12.

So if an organization configured its own instance of GitLab to accept passwords of no more than 21 characters, it looks like that an account takeover attack on that GitLab installation could use the default password of “123qweQWE!@#000000000” to access accounts created via OmniAuth.

The bug, with a 9.1 CVSS score, was found internally by GitLab and the fix has been applied to the company’s hosted service already, in conjunction with a limited password reset.

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Source: GitLab issues security fix for easy account takeover flaw • The Register

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