Code compiled to WASM may lack standard security defenses

[…]

In a paper titled, The Security Risk of Lacking Compiler Protection in WebAssembly, distributed via ArXiv, the technical trio say that when a C program is compiled to WASM, it may lack anti-exploit defenses that the programmer takes for granted on native architectures.

The reason for this, they explain, is that security protections available in compilers like Clang for x86 builds don’t show up when WASM output is produced.

“We compiled 4,469 C programs with known buffer overflow vulnerabilities to x86 code and to WebAssembly, and observed the outcome of the execution of the generated code to differ for 1,088 programs,” the paper states.

“Through manual inspection, we identified that the root cause for these is the lack of security measures such as stack canaries in the generated WebAssembly: while x86 code crashes upon a stack-based buffer overflow, the corresponding WebAssembly continues to be executed.”

[….]

For those not in the know, a stack is a structure in memory used by programs to store temporary variables and information controlling the operation of the application. A stack canary is a special value stored in the stack. When someone attempts to exploit, say, a buffer overflow vulnerability in an application, and overwrite data on the stack to hijack the program’s execution, they should end up overwriting the canary. Doing so will be detected by the program, allowing it to trap and end the exploitation attempt.

Without these canaries, an exploited WASM program could continue running, albeit at the bidding of whoever attacked it, whereas its x86 counterpart exits for its own protection, and that’s a potential security problem. Stack canaries aren’t a panacea, and they can be bypassed, though not having them at all makes exploitation a lot easier.

And these issues are not necessarily a deal-breaker: WASM bytecode still exists in a sandbox, and has further defenses against control-flow hijacking techniques such as return-oriented programming.

But as the researchers observe, WASM’s documentation insists that stack-smashing protection isn’t necessary for WASM code. The three boffins say their findings indicate security assumptions for x86 binaries should be questioned for WASM builds and should encourage others to explore the consequences of this divergent behavior, as it applies both to stack-based buffer overflows and other common security weaknesses.

[…]

Source: Code compiled to WASM may lack standard security defenses • The Register

Organisational Structures | Technology and Science | Military, IT and Lifestyle consultancy | Social, Broadcast & Cross Media | Flying aircraft