In a first, cryptographic keys protecting SSH connections stolen in new attack

For the first time, researchers have demonstrated that a large portion of cryptographic keys used to protect data in computer-to-server SSH traffic are vulnerable to complete compromise when naturally occurring computational errors occur while the connection is being established.

Underscoring the importance of their discovery, the researchers used their findings to calculate the private portion of almost 200 unique SSH keys they observed in public Internet scans taken over the past seven years. The researchers suspect keys used in IPsec connections could suffer the same fate. SSH is the cryptographic protocol used in secure shell connections that allows computers to remotely access servers, usually in security-sensitive enterprise environments. IPsec is a protocol used by virtual private networks that route traffic through an encrypted tunnel.

The vulnerability occurs when there are errors during the signature generation that takes place when a client and server are establishing a connection. It affects only keys using the RSA cryptographic algorithm, which the researchers found in roughly a third of the SSH signatures they examined. That translates to roughly 1 billion signatures out of the 3.2 billion signatures examined. Of the roughly 1 billion RSA signatures, about one in a million exposed the private key of the host.

While the percentage is infinitesimally small, the finding is nonetheless surprising for several reasons—most notably because most SSH software in use has deployed a countermeasure for decades that checks for signature faults before sending a signature over the Internet. Another reason for the surprise is that until now, researchers believed that signature faults exposed only RSA keys used in the TLS—or Transport Layer Security—protocol encrypting Web and email connections. They believed SSH traffic was immune from such attacks because passive attackers—meaning adversaries simply observing traffic as it goes by—couldn’t see some of the necessary information when the errors happened.


The new findings are laid out in a paper published earlier this month titled “Passive SSH Key Compromise via Lattices.” It builds on a series of discoveries spanning more than two decades. In 1996 and 1997, researchers published findings that, taken together, concluded that when naturally occurring computational errors resulted in a single faulty RSA signature, an adversary could use it to compute the private portion of the underlying key pair.

The reason: By comparing the malformed signature with a valid signature, the adversary could perform a GCD—or greatest common denominator—mathematical operation that, in turn, derived one of the prime numbers underpinning the security of the key. This led to a series of attacks that relied on actively triggering glitches during session negotiation, capturing the resulting faulty signature and eventually compromising the key. Triggering the errors relied on techniques such as tampering with a computer’s power supply or shining a laser on a smart card.

Then, in 2015, a researcher showed for the first time that attacks on keys used during TLS sessions were possible even when an adversary didn’t have physical access to the computing device. Instead, the attacker could simply connect to the device and opportunistically wait for a signature error to occur on its own. Last year, researchers found that even with countermeasures added to most TLS implementations as long as two decades earlier, they were still able to passively observe faulty signatures that allowed them to compromise the RSA keys of a small population of VPNs, network devices, and websites, most notably, a top-10 Alexa property.


The attack described in the paper published this month clears the hurdle of missing key material exposed in faulty SSH signatures by harnessing an advanced cryptanalytic technique involving the same mathematics found in lattice-based cryptography. The technique was first described in 2009, but the paper demonstrated only that it was theoretically possible to recover a key using incomplete information in a faulty signature. This month’s paper implements the technique in a real-world attack that uses a naturally occurring corrupted SSH signature to recover the underlying RSA key that generated it.


The researchers traced the keys they compromised to devices that used custom, closed-source SSH implementations that didn’t implement the countermeasures found in OpenSSH and other widely used open source code libraries. The devices came from four manufacturers: Cisco, Zyxel, Hillstone Networks, and Mocana.


Once attackers have possession of the secret key through passive observation of traffic, they can mount an active Mallory-in-the-middle attack against the SSH server, in which they use the key to impersonate the server and respond to incoming SSH traffic from clients. From there, the attackers can do things such as recover the client’s login credentials. Similar post-exploit attacks are also possible against IPsec servers if faults expose their private keys.


a single flip of a bit—in which a 0 residing in a memory chip register turns to 1 or vice versa—is all that’s required to trigger an error that exposes a secret RSA key. Consequently, it’s crucial that the countermeasures that detect and suppress such errors work with near-100 percent accuracy


Source: In a first, cryptographic keys protecting SSH connections stolen in new attack | Ars Technica

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